Biuletyny Informacyjne Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego .. police reports from the Polish IPN-archive Kamiński, Biuletyny dzienne, – różnego rodzaju instytucji (IPN, sądy) czy zapytania osób prywatnych. Szacunkowo można też przyjąć, że w ciągu 20 lat swojej działalności Fun-. as President of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) from to społecznym –, IPN, Warsaw , ISBN ; Biuletyny.
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It meant both the arrest of a Soviet officer of Polish origin, Konstantin Rokossowski, and the destruction of interwar Polish communism. It had to be reinvented and rebuilt during the war, and it underwent nationalization, Stalinization, and de-Stalinization in the period between and This essay uses the tenure of Rokossowski as Polish Minister of Defense between and to shed light on the tension between nationalist rhetoric and Sovietization and the ways in which Polish society and popular opinion reacted to these processes.
Stalinization, nationalism, internationalism, ethnicities, Polish—Soviet relations, Biupetyny Slavism. The Communist Party of Poland KPP was a stronghold of internationalism during the interwar years, and it paid dearly for this position, which fed into its unpopularity at home and contributed to the downfall of the the Party in Moscow.
Clearly, these were ip positions that were not acceptable in Polish society. Polish—Soviet relations had been hostile from the beginning, and neither side had forgotten the war fought in Still, the s saw a further deterioration of relations.
Inthe Comintern officially dissolved what was left of the Polish Communist Biuleyny. Surprisingly, in the midst of this terror, Comintern chieftain Georgi Dimitrov reflected on the revival of Polish communism.
In MayStalin and Dimitrov proposed the reestablishment of a Polish party. After the German invasion, this matter gained additional urgency. In AugustMoscow determined the format of the new organization. Still, the events of recent years and the traditional hostility between Poles and Russians would weigh heavy on any relaunch of Polish communism.
One of its Polish founders, biiletyny communist Alfred Lampe, expressed his doubts about the new mission. He understood that anti-Soviet consensus was the foundation of Polish politics, and he found it hard to imagine a Poland that was not anti-Soviet. He warned against violent Sovietization: The founding document of the PPR appealed to the national sentiments of the Polish population. Rather, the promise was made that a new Poland would be established with new borders, a nation-state that would be closely allied with the USSR.
Thus, Stalin and Dimitrov created a new type of communist statehood: The communist nation-state under Soviet patronage was founded in Lublin in July The Lublin manifesto reflected both the nationalism and the limited internationalism of the times: The establishment of communist rule in Poland was violent and repressive.
Ibuletyny committees and biuletynj society for friendship with the USSR were established in to spread the Slavic message. Initially, the postwar Soviet empire rested on the foundation of shared enmity with Germany, gratitude to the Red Army for the liberation of Central Europe, and the promise of national sovereignty within the Soviet sphere of influence.
In the long run, this proved to be one of the fault-lines of the Yalta order. Inthe party leadership understood the limits of its biuletyhy. During a Central Committee plenum in April, the functionaries came to a mixed assessment of their strategy. The restructuring of these attitudes will take a long time. The PPR was still seen as a foreign agent, something its leader desperately tried to change: His view corresponded with a popular joke of the times that offered an alternative reading of the acronym PPR: I;n 3, people attended the official celebration, some 30, joined Hlond in prayer.
The regime, on the other hand, tried to establish May 1 as a new Soviet-style celebration throughout Poland.
This competition led to a confrontation in Krakow after the regime banned the public celebration of constitution day. Police clashed with demonstrators biuletynh cleared the public arena by force. The onset of the Cold War and the firm hold on power of the party ended the more pragmatic approach that the regime had taken since It gave way to the utopian vision of a fully Sovietized Poland. The official culture was supposed to penetrate all layers of society.
Here, the official new blend of nationalism and internationalism was presented to the Polish public. Rather, it was the task and the desire of the biupetyny nation. Friendship with Moscow was more than a mere slogan. Clearly, this new urgency was partially due to the Cold War, which left its mark on internal Polish politics. The upn needed to show its readiness to act and its firm ties to the Soviet camp.
Łukasz Kamiński | Revolvy
But there is another way of looking at the changing face of repressive politics in postwar Poland. The mobilization campaigns that started in can also be biuletyyn as a sign of strength of the party-state. With the armed insurgency put down, the new borders more or less under control, and the legal opposition beheaded, the Polish regime could use its resources for an extensive propaganda campaign.
In Maythe Central Committee decided to give bluletyny friendship propaganda even higher priority. Biuletjny a consequence, every party member was supposed to become an agitator for friendship with the USSR. Essentially, national mobilization for the internationalist cause was supposed to be unlimited. The next goal of the propaganda apparatus was the celebration of the October Revolution. The festivities were not merely political education. The first highlight of the Ipb radicalization was the celebration of the 30 th anniversary of the October Revolution in the autumn of The campaign strove to mobilize all of Polish society: In the period of High Stalinism, the functionaries of the party-state were supposed to express their unlimited trust in their own propaganda.
Inthe new Stalinist course targeted not only the population. For us, comrades, the Soviet Union is our fatherland [nasza Ojczyzna], and Biuleryny cannot define its borders, today they might be behind Berlin, tomorrow already at Gibraltar.
They felt that propaganda for the USSR should be intensified. Stalin invited Rokossowski, who had served as commander of Soviet Army group North in Poland sinceto his dacha and made him an offer he could not refuse.
But there biuletynh certainly more aspects to the decision: Moscow clearly craved control of the Polish Army. It wanted to ensure that the second largest army in the empire would be modernized, loyal, and battle-ready if the Cold War turned hot.
The scenario in Biulettyny, with the military victory of the Chinese communists iph the Korean War, suggested that military conflict might flare up again in Europe. Rokossowski could exercise control over the Armed Forces and report to Stalin on upn party. And through his public position, Rokossowski would serve as a constant reminder of the limited sovereignty of communist nation-states. The army, traditionally viewed as the core of independent Polish statehood, was put biuletyng under Soviet control.
Yet, publicly, a different story was told: He had liberated the northern part of the country during World War II, and he had remained in Poland to command Red Army troops who remained stationed in Silesia. Loyalty to the USSR manifested itself in carefully stage-managed gestures of the biueltyny towards him. During the winter ofseveral Polish towns made him an honorary citizen. Biupetyny, the arts, film, and political education sensu strictu played an important role during these weeks.
It was to be a special year because the campaign would last even longer than it had in previous years: Furthermore, the news could be spread in the controlled setting of the Biyletyny celebrations. The propaganda and the security apparatus would be on the alert, and this would reduce the risk of spontaneous protests or rioting. The official appointment was not made until November, giving the party-state a few weeks to prepare the event.
The campaign around Rokossowski focused on reinventing his public persona and his vita and welcoming him home as a Polish Patriot. On biuetyny day of his inauguration into office three short biographies were distributed: All three officially released biographies constructed a contrast between his vita and the fate of the Polish nation. Rokossowski could be a communist patriot because he biuletynyy not played any role in the ill-fated interwar Polish republic.
Instead, he had chosen the Soviet side indefended Soviet power during the Civil War in Russia, and risen in the ranks of the Red Army. According to this leitmotif, he had had to abandon his nation because it had chosen the wrong path. A nation that had erred had lost its son, who had only been able to come home because the nation had returned to the right path of history. According to the official narrative, it was beneficial to have chosen the Soviet side as early as possible; it was also important to emphasize this because so many Poles had suffered under Soviet rule.
According to the official narrative, Rokossowski was born in Warsaw, the son of a railway worker. During World War I, he was drafted into the Imperial Army, and he left his homeland during the retreat to the east.
In Russia, he sided with the revolution, defending it in the civil war and, through determination and hard work, rising to the position of general. Furthermore, he had decisively intervened in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. His participation in the liberation of Poland was emphasized, as was his urge to help the uprising in Warsaw, which was sabotaged by the leadership of the Armia Krajowa.
His vita was constructed along similar lines in all three biographies. The texts were also garnished with anecdotes which were supposed to convey his Polishness. Poles meet him during the war and they are drawn to him because they recognize him as a compatriot, even before he speaks and despite his Soviet uniform. One story has Rokossowski correct a translator, which prompts a Polish lady to shout: On the way to Berlin, the friendship between the Polish people and their lost son strengthened.
Because of his heroic deeds, the biographers insisted, Marshall Rokossowski represented the best traditions of Polish freedom fighters. Hiuletyny was portrayed as continuing the national struggle that had started centuries ago. The biographies demanded a warm welcome for Rokossowski by the Polish public: In addition to the party and the TPPR, other mass-organizations were involved in the campaign.
The result of these meetings was supposed to be a discussion which would lead to telegrams from all parts of the country in support of the Marshal. The stage-management of public approval was part of the larger mobilization campaign to celebrate the October anniversary. It was part of an effort to bluletyny opinion, contain resistance builetyny expressions of disapproval, and exhibit public enthusiasm.