: The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Library of Living Philosophers ) (): Bertrand Russell, David Pears: Books. Bertrand Russell – – The Monist 29 (2) Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein. Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM. III. ATOMIC AND Mr. Russell: I was not going into the question of existence after Bertrand Russell. London.
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Patterson bertrad – Russell: It should be noted, however, that there is significant controversy over whether, in the end, Wittgenstein himself meant to endorse this metaphysics.
Logical atomism – Wikipedia
You cannot name them at all. While propositions represent the content of judgments, according to Moore, they and their constituents are entirely independent from the judging mind.
Eames – – International Studies in Philosophy 27 4: Here, Russell expressed doubt about the existence of any relations of logical dependence between atomic propositions, but the fact that he left it as a open possibility makes it seem that he would not consider it a defining feature of an atomic proposition that it must be independent from all others, or a central tenet of logical atomism generally that atomic facts are independent from one another.
University of Toronto Press. According to Russell, it is unnecessary to suppose that there exists any special sort of fact corresponding to molecular propositions; the berhrand of a molecular proposition could be entirely derivative on the truth-values of its constituents PLA For Wittgenstein, metaphysics and ethics were nonsensical, though he did not mean to devalue their importance in life by describing them in this way.
I am using it in a sense to include all language of every sort and kind, so that every word is a symbol, and every sentence, and so forth. TK Theory of Knowledge: This relation among the properties would itself be an asymmetrical and transitive relation, and so the analysis has not rid us of the need for taking relations as ultimate.
The rest of the time you think about the symbols, because they are tangible, but the thing you are supposed to be thinking about is fearfully difficult and one does not often manage to think about it. Although Russell changed his mind on a great number of philosophical issues throughout his career, one of the most stable elements in his views is the endorsement of a certain methodology for approaching philosophy. According to Russell, this conception allowed the primitives of Peano’s analysis to be defined fully in terms of the notion of a class, along with other logical notions such as identity, quantification, negation and the conditional.
A name would be a proper symbol to use for a person; a sentence or a proposition is the proper symbol for a fact. Russell did on occasion also speak of analyzing a particular proposition of ordinary life.
It will not really be the same as the thing we started from because it will be so much more analytic and precise. Selected Writingsed. If I start with the statement that there are so and so many people in this room, and then set to work to make that statement precise, I shall run a great many risks and it will be extremely likely that any precise statement I make will be something not true at all.
Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise, and everything precise is so remote from everything that we normally think, that you cannot for a moment suppose that is what we really mean when we say what we think. One is not committed to a nonexistent entity such as the King of France simply in order to understand the make-up of the proposition. On Russell’s view, vagueness is a feature of language, not of the world. Atomic, Negative and General 4.
Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lectures – PhilPapers
InRussell had already criticized Alexius Meinongwhose theories led to the paradox of the simultaneous existence and non-existence of fictional objects. Then there are facts about the properties of single things; and facts about the relations between two things, three things, and so on; and any number of different classifications of some of the facts in the world, which are important for different purposes.
Academic Tools How to wtomism this entry. A fact may be that an object has a property or that it stands in some relation to other objects. The really good philosopher is the one who does once in six months think about it for a minute.
Russell’s views on this matter changed over different periods, as his own views regarding the nature of judgment, belief and representation matured. Elementary propositions are propositions whose truth depends entirely on the presence of an atomic fact, and other propositions have a determinate and unique analysis ;hilosophy which they can be construed as built up from elementary propositions in truth-functional ways.
There is the type of mind which considers that beryrand is called primitive experience must be a better guide to wisdom than the experience of reflective persons, and there is the type of mind which takes exactly the opposite view. This attitude is confirmed especially in Russell’s early logical atomist writings. Perhaps I ought to say a word or two about what I am understanding by symbolism, because I think some people think you only mean mathematical symbols when you talk about symbolism.
Ian Proops – – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Logifal According to Russell, phiosophy fact is a kind of complex, and depends for its existence on the simpler entities making it up. In the abstract, there are two sorts of arguments Russell could have given for the existence of simples, a priori arguments, or empirical arguments cf.
Russell’s Logical Atomism
The wish for perfect security is one of those snares we are always falling into, and is just as untenable in the realm of knowledge as in everything philospohy. Indeed, Russell himself later came to admit that one could not know simply on the basis of something being complex that it must be composed of simples MPD Russell and Moore broke themselves free from British Idealism in the s.
But it obviously is not. Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusLondon: Cambridge University Press, —27 First edition — The Monist 28 4: